Virgin Atlantic Offers Mobile Service in the Skies

AppId is over the quota
AppId is over the quota

By Deanna Cioppa

What goes through your head when the flight attendants announce that it's time to turn off phones and electronic devices? Is it "ah, finally, peace and quiet," "wait! I forgot to call [someone not that important]," or do you smile snidely and take no heed of their direction? Well, you're not going to hear that announcement for much longer, on Virgin Atlantic flights anyway.

With the official reveal of its Airbus 330-300 (flying between New York and London), the airline is offering in-flight cell phone usage for its flyers. According to a release, passengers on the new Airbus will be able to make calls, send and receive texts and emails, and have access to the web at 35,000 feet, via General Packet Radio Service (GPRS). By the end of the year, the airline says the service will be available for nearly 20 of its aircraft. The cost of the service is a bit steep—one British pound (or about $1.59) per minute, but can go up based on your network provider.

While the service is available throughout the plane, Virgin says it's mainly directed at business travelers who need to make a short call or send an email or two—"exceptional situations," as the airline puts it. To that end, only six users will be able to connect to the service at a time.

Despite that low number, some have been voicing concern over the potential for loud (or worse, boring) phone chit-chat in cabins. After Tuesday's announcement, the Associated Press wrote, "The British airline's new service could be a blessing for business travelers who want to stay connected during eight-hour flights across the ocean. It could also be a nightmare for the passenger sitting next to them."

Sarah McIntyre at Virgin's U.S. public relations office tried to assuage those worries. "This is more about people making a brief call to the car picking them up," she said in a phone interview, and not meant for passengers to be "chatting away." The feedback during the airline's trial period with the new service, she said, has been "very positive so far."

This development and the new Airbus is part a $160 million investment by Virgin Atlantic. Other digital goodies include a "technology hub" in the new airplane's Upper Class cabin with connections for smartphones, USB, and tablets, and a new in-flight entertainment system called Jam.

The service, dubbed AeroMobile, is initially available for customers using the O2 and Vodafone mobile networks. Service will still be unavailable during takeoff, landing, and within 250 miles of US airspace.

What do you think of Virgin Atlantic's new phone service? Weigh in in the comments below.

Photo credits: Courtesy of Virgin Atlantic

View the original article here

Read More

Levels of Selection, Logical Schemes, Selfish Genes, and Misleading Memes

AppId is over the quota
AppId is over the quota

Both Nature and Science are currently celebrating the 100th anniversary of the birth of an icon of logic, computer science, and mathematical biology: Alan Turing.  In reading Andrew Hodges’s spectacular biography of Turing (1983) many years ago I came to appreciate that the subject of the book was both a deeply creative and extraordinarily rigorous thinker.  Although Turing is known for seminal achievements in mathematical logic and computer science, his most directly practical and immediately consequential contribution was his facilitation of the Allied cause in World War II through his guidance of the effort to break the Nazi military code.  This effort called primarily on his prodigious talents for far-reaching inference and it was in reading about this effort that I was prompted to consider a concept that might be called “maximum deduction.”  Turing and his able colleagues needed to make every possible deductive inference (or at least very close to every possible inference) supported by the available data on German military communications in order to solve a problem of immense and immediate impact (the saving of Allied ships from devastating German submarine attacks).

In reading Samir Okasha’s thorough and insightful guide to the theoretical debates about multi-level selection, Evolution and the Levels of Selection (2006), I am reminded of Turing’s logical rigor. Like Turing, Okasha possesses the ability to fully explore the implications of an intellectual position.  Of similar value, he makes key distinctions that elude or at least receive inadequate attention from others and fairly assesses alternative conceptual schemes or theoretical approaches.  For example, his examination of the relative merits of the Price equation versus what he refers to as the “contextual analysis” for assessing and partitioning selection in differing evolutionary scenarios reveals that each has important advantages as well as significant weaknesses.  Much to his credit, he does not seek a neat but oversimplified and misleading conclusion.  The figures are simple but effective and substantially aid the exposition.

I cannot attempt to summarize all of the arguments in the book of about 240 pages because Okasha’s arguments are of sufficient intricacy and subtlety that it would be nearly impossible to substantially compress them without causing serious distortions in the reasoning.  Therefore, I will just note the topics addressed and remark on a limited number of particularly interesting points.

Okasha begins the book by introducing and characterizing the levels-of-selection problem and explicating the essence of natural selection in abstract formal terms.  He then addresses the distinction between the synchronic and diachronic perspectives, where the former deals with the hierarchical organization of the living world (e.g. cells, multicellular organisms, communities of multicellular organisms) such as it is and the latter is concerned with how the hierarchy arose.  Next, the author introduces and explains the interpretation of the equation formulated by George Price forty years ago to describe in mathematical terms the evolution of a population from one generation to the next.  He also delves into the sometimes-consequential differences between statistical and causal decompositions of changes in organismal characters across generation.  This chapter ends with an interesting discussion of the connections between the Price equation and the formal conditions for evolution promulgated more than forty years ago by the eminent population geneticist, Richard Lewontin, which were initially described at the beginning of the chapter.

The second chapter explains the fundamentals of multi-level selection, including explorations of life cycles, relevant definitions of fitness, and the distinction between multi-level selection 1 (MLS1) and multi-level selection 2 (MLS2).  For MLS1, what Okasha calls the ‘focal’ level is concerned with the number of offspring, in the next generation, of the particles that constitute a collective or group and for MLS2 the ‘focal’ level is concerned with the number of offspring groups in the succeeding generation.  Another key distinction that Okasha addresses is that between aggregate and emergent properties of collectives.  Okasha then tackles heritability and how the concept differs for MLS1 and MLS2 and includes a discussion of how the Price equation can be applied for the two types of multi-level selection.

Chapter three focuses on notions of causality and deals with the fairly subtle notion of cross-level by-products in which apparent selection on one level can in fact result from selection at another level.  In this portion of the book, the author introduces contextual analysis, which relies on linear regression models, and compares it to the approach associated with the Price equation.

What the author describes as philosophical issues take up the fourth chapter.  The section sub-headings will give a sense of the subject matter being addressed: emergence and additivity, screening off and the levels of selection, realism versus pluralism about the levels of selection, and reductionism.

Chapter five is entitled “The Gene’s-Eye View and its Discontents.”  After tracing the gene-centered perspective back to R. A. Fisher and reviewing the contributions of individuals such as W. D. Hamilton, G. C. Williams, and Richard Dawkins, Okasha makes the critical distinction between a gene’s-eye view of evolution and genic selection.  In this context, Okasha notes what he believes to be a shift in position by Dawkins.  Next the author discusses outlaw genes or selfish genetic elements (SGEs).  These DNA sequences manage to be transmitted at increased frequencies into the gametes (the phenomenon of meiotic drive or segregation distortion) and, therefore, into the next generation thereby exhibiting increased fitnesses relative to non-SGEs.  Thus, I would suggest that selfishness is a quantitative not a qualitative trait.  The Price equation and contextual analysis are then compared as to how these two approaches account for the behavior of SGEs.  Okasha then demonstrates why the gene-centered perspective is not, as sometimes claimed, a completely general way to account for any evolutionary scenario, e.g., when dealing with non-genetic inheritance, plants that produce vegetative entities that are often genetically chimeric (i.e., ramets), and insect colonies founded by multiple queens or multiply-mated queens.  The genic perspective also is less obviously successful when non-additive interactions between genes are present, which is reasonably common.  An interesting point that Okasha makes is that whenever SGEs arise, there is likely to be selection on the unlinked ‘law abiding’ genetic elements to suppress the ‘cheaters’ since SGEs typically enhance their own fitnesses at the cost of diminishing the fitness of the organism with respect to which they may reasonably regarded as parasites of a sort.

The sixth chapter addresses the still active and evolving controversy or group selection as of 2006.  Okasha provides historical background, discusses the distinction between MLS1 and MLS2 in the context of the controversy, explores how ideas about kin selection, reciprocal altruism, and evolutionary game theory feature in the debates, and describes the roles of a number of other concepts in the key disagreements in the literature.

The final two chapters address macroevolutionary issues that may be less obviously relevant to those focused on the relevance of evolution to medicine.  Therefore, I will refrain from a detailed description of the content of these sections and just note an insight offered therein. Whenever there is a major evolutionary transition, as from individual genes to whole genomes or single-celled to multi-celled organisms, there must be selection against within-group conflict and selfishness of the ‘lower-level’ units and this selection must be effective for the more-complex level of the biological hierarchy to be successfully established.  Thus, one consequence of relentless competition is cooperation and all genes are not, as Dawkins suggested early in The Selfish Gene (1976, 1989), ruthlessly selfish unless ruthless selfishness embodies some measure of cooperativeness.

References

Hodges, A. Alan Turing: The Enigma. A Touchstone Book, Simon & Schuster, Inc., New York, 1983.

Okasha, Samir. Evolution and the Levels of Selection. Oxford University press, 2006.

Dawkins, R. The Selfish Gene. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1976, 1989 p. 2.

Tags: additive characters, Alan Turing, causal decomposition, cells, computer science, contextual analysis, cooperation, cross-level by-products, diachronic, emergent characters, evolution, evolutionary game theory, focal level, G. C. Williams, gametes, genes, gene’s-eye perspective, genic selection, George Price, hierarchical organization, kin selection, levels-of-selection controversy, logic, macroevolution, mathematics, maximum deduction, meiotic drive, military code, multi-cellular organisms, multi-level selection 1, multi-level selection 2, pluralism, Price equation, R. A. Fisher, realism, reciprocal altruism, reductionism, Richard Dawkins, Richard Lewontin, selfish genetic element, statistical decomposition, synchronic, W. D. Hamilton

View the original article here

Read More

Levels of Selection, Logical Schemes, Selfish Genes, and Misleading Memes

AppId is over the quota
AppId is over the quota

Both Nature and Science are currently celebrating the 100th anniversary of the birth of an icon of logic, computer science, and mathematical biology: Alan Turing.  In reading Andrew Hodges’s spectacular biography of Turing (1983) many years ago I came to appreciate that the subject of the book was both a deeply creative and extraordinarily rigorous thinker.  Although Turing is known for seminal achievements in mathematical logic and computer science, his most directly practical and immediately consequential contribution was his facilitation of the Allied cause in World War II through his guidance of the effort to break the Nazi military code.  This effort called primarily on his prodigious talents for far-reaching inference and it was in reading about this effort that I was prompted to consider a concept that might be called “maximum deduction.”  Turing and his able colleagues needed to make every possible deductive inference (or at least very close to every possible inference) supported by the available data on German military communications in order to solve a problem of immense and immediate impact (the saving of Allied ships from devastating German submarine attacks).

In reading Samir Okasha’s thorough and insightful guide to the theoretical debates about multi-level selection, Evolution and the Levels of Selection (2006), I am reminded of Turing’s logical rigor. Like Turing, Okasha possesses the ability to fully explore the implications of an intellectual position.  Of similar value, he makes key distinctions that elude or at least receive inadequate attention from others and fairly assesses alternative conceptual schemes or theoretical approaches.  For example, his examination of the relative merits of the Price equation versus what he refers to as the “contextual analysis” for assessing and partitioning selection in differing evolutionary scenarios reveals that each has important advantages as well as significant weaknesses.  Much to his credit, he does not seek a neat but oversimplified and misleading conclusion.  The figures are simple but effective and substantially aid the exposition.

I cannot attempt to summarize all of the arguments in the book of about 240 pages because Okasha’s arguments are of sufficient intricacy and subtlety that it would be nearly impossible to substantially compress them without causing serious distortions in the reasoning.  Therefore, I will just note the topics addressed and remark on a limited number of particularly interesting points.

Okasha begins the book by introducing and characterizing the levels-of-selection problem and explicating the essence of natural selection in abstract formal terms.  He then addresses the distinction between the synchronic and diachronic perspectives, where the former deals with the hierarchical organization of the living world (e.g. cells, multicellular organisms, communities of multicellular organisms) such as it is and the latter is concerned with how the hierarchy arose.  Next, the author introduces and explains the interpretation of the equation formulated by George Price forty years ago to describe in mathematical terms the evolution of a population from one generation to the next.  He also delves into the sometimes-consequential differences between statistical and causal decompositions of changes in organismal characters across generation.  This chapter ends with an interesting discussion of the connections between the Price equation and the formal conditions for evolution promulgated more than forty years ago by the eminent population geneticist, Richard Lewontin, which were initially described at the beginning of the chapter.

The second chapter explains the fundamentals of multi-level selection, including explorations of life cycles, relevant definitions of fitness, and the distinction between multi-level selection 1 (MLS1) and multi-level selection 2 (MLS2).  For MLS1, what Okasha calls the ‘focal’ level is concerned with the number of offspring, in the next generation, of the particles that constitute a collective or group and for MLS2 the ‘focal’ level is concerned with the number of offspring groups in the succeeding generation.  Another key distinction that Okasha addresses is that between aggregate and emergent properties of collectives.  Okasha then tackles heritability and how the concept differs for MLS1 and MLS2 and includes a discussion of how the Price equation can be applied for the two types of multi-level selection.

Chapter three focuses on notions of causality and deals with the fairly subtle notion of cross-level by-products in which apparent selection on one level can in fact result from selection at another level.  In this portion of the book, the author introduces contextual analysis, which relies on linear regression models, and compares it to the approach associated with the Price equation.

What the author describes as philosophical issues take up the fourth chapter.  The section sub-headings will give a sense of the subject matter being addressed: emergence and additivity, screening off and the levels of selection, realism versus pluralism about the levels of selection, and reductionism.

Chapter five is entitled “The Gene’s-Eye View and its Discontents.”  After tracing the gene-centered perspective back to R. A. Fisher and reviewing the contributions of individuals such as W. D. Hamilton, G. C. Williams, and Richard Dawkins, Okasha makes the critical distinction between a gene’s-eye view of evolution and genic selection.  In this context, Okasha notes what he believes to be a shift in position by Dawkins.  Next the author discusses outlaw genes or selfish genetic elements (SGEs).  These DNA sequences manage to be transmitted at increased frequencies into the gametes (the phenomenon of meiotic drive or segregation distortion) and, therefore, into the next generation thereby exhibiting increased fitnesses relative to non-SGEs.  Thus, I would suggest that selfishness is a quantitative not a qualitative trait.  The Price equation and contextual analysis are then compared as to how these two approaches account for the behavior of SGEs.  Okasha then demonstrates why the gene-centered perspective is not, as sometimes claimed, a completely general way to account for any evolutionary scenario, e.g., when dealing with non-genetic inheritance, plants that produce vegetative entities that are often genetically chimeric (i.e., ramets), and insect colonies founded by multiple queens or multiply-mated queens.  The genic perspective also is less obviously successful when non-additive interactions between genes are present, which is reasonably common.  An interesting point that Okasha makes is that whenever SGEs arise, there is likely to be selection on the unlinked ‘law abiding’ genetic elements to suppress the ‘cheaters’ since SGEs typically enhance their own fitnesses at the cost of diminishing the fitness of the organism with respect to which they may reasonably regarded as parasites of a sort.

The sixth chapter addresses the still active and evolving controversy or group selection as of 2006.  Okasha provides historical background, discusses the distinction between MLS1 and MLS2 in the context of the controversy, explores how ideas about kin selection, reciprocal altruism, and evolutionary game theory feature in the debates, and describes the roles of a number of other concepts in the key disagreements in the literature.

The final two chapters address macroevolutionary issues that may be less obviously relevant to those focused on the relevance of evolution to medicine.  Therefore, I will refrain from a detailed description of the content of these sections and just note an insight offered therein. Whenever there is a major evolutionary transition, as from individual genes to whole genomes or single-celled to multi-celled organisms, there must be selection against within-group conflict and selfishness of the ‘lower-level’ units and this selection must be effective for the more-complex level of the biological hierarchy to be successfully established.  Thus, one consequence of relentless competition is cooperation and all genes are not, as Dawkins suggested early in The Selfish Gene (1976, 1989), ruthlessly selfish unless ruthless selfishness embodies some measure of cooperativeness.

References

Hodges, A. Alan Turing: The Enigma. A Touchstone Book, Simon & Schuster, Inc., New York, 1983.

Okasha, Samir. Evolution and the Levels of Selection. Oxford University press, 2006.

Dawkins, R. The Selfish Gene. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1976, 1989 p. 2.

Tags: additive characters, Alan Turing, causal decomposition, cells, computer science, contextual analysis, cooperation, cross-level by-products, diachronic, emergent characters, evolution, evolutionary game theory, focal level, G. C. Williams, gametes, genes, gene’s-eye perspective, genic selection, George Price, hierarchical organization, kin selection, levels-of-selection controversy, logic, macroevolution, mathematics, maximum deduction, meiotic drive, military code, multi-cellular organisms, multi-level selection 1, multi-level selection 2, pluralism, Price equation, R. A. Fisher, realism, reciprocal altruism, reductionism, Richard Dawkins, Richard Lewontin, selfish genetic element, statistical decomposition, synchronic, W. D. Hamilton

View the original article here

Read More

Levels of Selection, Logical Schemes, Selfish Genes, and Misleading Memes

AppId is over the quota
AppId is over the quota

Both Nature and Science are currently celebrating the 100th anniversary of the birth of an icon of logic, computer science, and mathematical biology: Alan Turing.  In reading Andrew Hodges’s spectacular biography of Turing (1983) many years ago I came to appreciate that the subject of the book was both a deeply creative and extraordinarily rigorous thinker.  Although Turing is known for seminal achievements in mathematical logic and computer science, his most directly practical and immediately consequential contribution was his facilitation of the Allied cause in World War II through his guidance of the effort to break the Nazi military code.  This effort called primarily on his prodigious talents for far-reaching inference and it was in reading about this effort that I was prompted to consider a concept that might be called “maximum deduction.”  Turing and his able colleagues needed to make every possible deductive inference (or at least very close to every possible inference) supported by the available data on German military communications in order to solve a problem of immense and immediate impact (the saving of Allied ships from devastating German submarine attacks).

In reading Samir Okasha’s thorough and insightful guide to the theoretical debates about multi-level selection, Evolution and the Levels of Selection (2006), I am reminded of Turing’s logical rigor. Like Turing, Okasha possesses the ability to fully explore the implications of an intellectual position.  Of similar value, he makes key distinctions that elude or at least receive inadequate attention from others and fairly assesses alternative conceptual schemes or theoretical approaches.  For example, his examination of the relative merits of the Price equation versus what he refers to as the “contextual analysis” for assessing and partitioning selection in differing evolutionary scenarios reveals that each has important advantages as well as significant weaknesses.  Much to his credit, he does not seek a neat but oversimplified and misleading conclusion.  The figures are simple but effective and substantially aid the exposition.

I cannot attempt to summarize all of the arguments in the book of about 240 pages because Okasha’s arguments are of sufficient intricacy and subtlety that it would be nearly impossible to substantially compress them without causing serious distortions in the reasoning.  Therefore, I will just note the topics addressed and remark on a limited number of particularly interesting points.

Okasha begins the book by introducing and characterizing the levels-of-selection problem and explicating the essence of natural selection in abstract formal terms.  He then addresses the distinction between the synchronic and diachronic perspectives, where the former deals with the hierarchical organization of the living world (e.g. cells, multicellular organisms, communities of multicellular organisms) such as it is and the latter is concerned with how the hierarchy arose.  Next, the author introduces and explains the interpretation of the equation formulated by George Price forty years ago to describe in mathematical terms the evolution of a population from one generation to the next.  He also delves into the sometimes-consequential differences between statistical and causal decompositions of changes in organismal characters across generation.  This chapter ends with an interesting discussion of the connections between the Price equation and the formal conditions for evolution promulgated more than forty years ago by the eminent population geneticist, Richard Lewontin, which were initially described at the beginning of the chapter.

The second chapter explains the fundamentals of multi-level selection, including explorations of life cycles, relevant definitions of fitness, and the distinction between multi-level selection 1 (MLS1) and multi-level selection 2 (MLS2).  For MLS1, what Okasha calls the ‘focal’ level is concerned with the number of offspring, in the next generation, of the particles that constitute a collective or group and for MLS2 the ‘focal’ level is concerned with the number of offspring groups in the succeeding generation.  Another key distinction that Okasha addresses is that between aggregate and emergent properties of collectives.  Okasha then tackles heritability and how the concept differs for MLS1 and MLS2 and includes a discussion of how the Price equation can be applied for the two types of multi-level selection.

Chapter three focuses on notions of causality and deals with the fairly subtle notion of cross-level by-products in which apparent selection on one level can in fact result from selection at another level.  In this portion of the book, the author introduces contextual analysis, which relies on linear regression models, and compares it to the approach associated with the Price equation.

What the author describes as philosophical issues take up the fourth chapter.  The section sub-headings will give a sense of the subject matter being addressed: emergence and additivity, screening off and the levels of selection, realism versus pluralism about the levels of selection, and reductionism.

Chapter five is entitled “The Gene’s-Eye View and its Discontents.”  After tracing the gene-centered perspective back to R. A. Fisher and reviewing the contributions of individuals such as W. D. Hamilton, G. C. Williams, and Richard Dawkins, Okasha makes the critical distinction between a gene’s-eye view of evolution and genic selection.  In this context, Okasha notes what he believes to be a shift in position by Dawkins.  Next the author discusses outlaw genes or selfish genetic elements (SGEs).  These DNA sequences manage to be transmitted at increased frequencies into the gametes (the phenomenon of meiotic drive or segregation distortion) and, therefore, into the next generation thereby exhibiting increased fitnesses relative to non-SGEs.  Thus, I would suggest that selfishness is a quantitative not a qualitative trait.  The Price equation and contextual analysis are then compared as to how these two approaches account for the behavior of SGEs.  Okasha then demonstrates why the gene-centered perspective is not, as sometimes claimed, a completely general way to account for any evolutionary scenario, e.g., when dealing with non-genetic inheritance, plants that produce vegetative entities that are often genetically chimeric (i.e., ramets), and insect colonies founded by multiple queens or multiply-mated queens.  The genic perspective also is less obviously successful when non-additive interactions between genes are present, which is reasonably common.  An interesting point that Okasha makes is that whenever SGEs arise, there is likely to be selection on the unlinked ‘law abiding’ genetic elements to suppress the ‘cheaters’ since SGEs typically enhance their own fitnesses at the cost of diminishing the fitness of the organism with respect to which they may reasonably regarded as parasites of a sort.

The sixth chapter addresses the still active and evolving controversy or group selection as of 2006.  Okasha provides historical background, discusses the distinction between MLS1 and MLS2 in the context of the controversy, explores how ideas about kin selection, reciprocal altruism, and evolutionary game theory feature in the debates, and describes the roles of a number of other concepts in the key disagreements in the literature.

The final two chapters address macroevolutionary issues that may be less obviously relevant to those focused on the relevance of evolution to medicine.  Therefore, I will refrain from a detailed description of the content of these sections and just note an insight offered therein. Whenever there is a major evolutionary transition, as from individual genes to whole genomes or single-celled to multi-celled organisms, there must be selection against within-group conflict and selfishness of the ‘lower-level’ units and this selection must be effective for the more-complex level of the biological hierarchy to be successfully established.  Thus, one consequence of relentless competition is cooperation and all genes are not, as Dawkins suggested early in The Selfish Gene (1976, 1989), ruthlessly selfish unless ruthless selfishness embodies some measure of cooperativeness.

References

Hodges, A. Alan Turing: The Enigma. A Touchstone Book, Simon & Schuster, Inc., New York, 1983.

Okasha, Samir. Evolution and the Levels of Selection. Oxford University press, 2006.

Dawkins, R. The Selfish Gene. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1976, 1989 p. 2.

Tags: additive characters, Alan Turing, causal decomposition, cells, computer science, contextual analysis, cooperation, cross-level by-products, diachronic, emergent characters, evolution, evolutionary game theory, focal level, G. C. Williams, gametes, genes, gene’s-eye perspective, genic selection, George Price, hierarchical organization, kin selection, levels-of-selection controversy, logic, macroevolution, mathematics, maximum deduction, meiotic drive, military code, multi-cellular organisms, multi-level selection 1, multi-level selection 2, pluralism, Price equation, R. A. Fisher, realism, reciprocal altruism, reductionism, Richard Dawkins, Richard Lewontin, selfish genetic element, statistical decomposition, synchronic, W. D. Hamilton

View the original article here

Read More

What (Not) to Wear in Europe: Men's Edition

AppId is over the quota
AppId is over the quota

By Rachel Felder

Gearing up for a summer getaway is certainly exciting; figuring out what's appropriate to wear on your trip, well, not so much. Whether you're heading to a vibrant European capital or an ultra-relaxing beach resort, knowing what to pack can be a daunting task. For men, the safest plan, regardless of destination, is to keep things simple, packing versatile basics in neutral shades of navy, gray, khaki, black, and white.

"I would definitely bring an unlined blazer that's comfortable and more casual but still gives you the look of a tailored jacket," suggests Matt Marden, Fashion Market Director at DETAILS magazine. "Something like a navy suit or a gray suit is also great to bring because you can break up the pieces and dress them up or down with a white button down or a navy blue t-shirt."

Marden also suggests bringing jeans in dark denim (since it's more polished than lighter washes), a pair of comfortable dress shoes, and a pair of classic white sneakers, which can be worn with a suit (to give it a more casual feel) as well as shorts and a simple tee.

Of course, some of what needs to be packed depends on where you're going. Here are Marden's tips for the most popular types of summer destinations:

"If you're going to be in a city in the summer, it's great to get key items in fabrics like cotton and linen," Marden advises. "They have an effortless feel to them and look chic even if they get wrinkly." What not to pack? "I would not bring anything like a flip-flop, any sort of gym shorts unless you're going to run in them, or graphic t-shirts or destination t-shirts. Most quote unquote 'tacky tourists' wear a lot of logos, so I would avoid logos at all costs, even on your luggage."

For this type of trip, the goal is to look relaxed and lowkey "I love wearing a pair of shorts—more of a tailored short, nothing 'cargoey' with tons of pockets—with a dress shoe if you're going to a small town," Marden says "Another great thing is bringing a grey sweatshirt, because that looks good with khakis and it's super comfortable, easy, and breathable if you're running all around. If you're sightseeing in the morning and it's cool you can wear it, then wrap it around your waist or shoulders as it gets warmer later in the day."

"Unless you're a male model or an Olympian—or have the body of either—you don't want to be rocking a Speedo on the beach," Marden laughs, suggesting that swim trunks should fall between mid-thigh and just above the knee. "Grown men should not be wearing any sort of board shorts because that gets to be a little goofy."

For the journey to and from your destination, Marden says the priority is ease. "I love a chino on the airplane, or a dress pant, because they're comfortable," he says. "Jeans get to be too heavy sometimes. A slim fitting cargo pant also would work." He also suggests wearing a cardigan sweater, since planes can get drafty.

For up-to-the-minute hotel and restaurant recommendations, as well as the best planning advice, check out our Europe Travel Guide.

But although it's important to be comfortable, particularly for long haul flights, Marden says not to take that goal too far. "I would never wear sweatpants," he says.

Photo Credits: Chic European City: TommL/iStockphoto.com; Small Town:

View the original article here

Read More

Disease Tolerance as a Defense Strategy

AppId is over the quota AppId is over the quota

Abstract
The immune system protects from infections primarily by detecting and eliminating the invading pathogens; however, the host organism can also protect itself from infectious diseases by reducing the negative impact of infections on host fitness. This ability to tolerate a pathogen’s presence is a distinct host defense strategy, which has been largely overlooked in animal and human studies. Introduction of the notion of “disease tolerance” into the conceptual tool kit of immunology will expand our understanding of infectious diseases and host pathogen interactions. Analysis of disease tolerance mechanisms should provide new approaches for the treatment of infections and other diseases.

Posted in Autoimmune disease, evolutionary medicine

 

Read More

Disease Tolerance as a Defense Strategy

AppId is over the quota AppId is over the quota

Abstract
The immune system protects from infections primarily by detecting and eliminating the invading pathogens; however, the host organism can also protect itself from infectious diseases by reducing the negative impact of infections on host fitness. This ability to tolerate a pathogen’s presence is a distinct host defense strategy, which has been largely overlooked in animal and human studies. Introduction of the notion of “disease tolerance” into the conceptual tool kit of immunology will expand our understanding of infectious diseases and host pathogen interactions. Analysis of disease tolerance mechanisms should provide new approaches for the treatment of infections and other diseases.

Posted in Autoimmune disease, evolutionary medicine

 

Read More